The Epoch Times
Interview with renowned Chinese social economist Ms. He Qinglian
An interview with Chinese social economist He Qinglian reveals the Chinese Communist Party’s true nature and means of influencing overseas Western international media.
Reporter: The German-based Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung recently published a special interview with you, issuing a statement from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) democratic section and many Chinese intellectuals, regarding the “Zhang Danhong incident.” Some members of the public are curious about what the content of the interview was.
He Qinglian: The interview was conducted a half month ago, and involved several aspects:
First, whether China was heading toward press freedom;
Second, whether Chinese people pursued money at the price of sacrificing press freedom, and if that were the case, did it justify China’s suppression of freedom of speech;
Third, comment on what Zhang Danhaong said in her report, where Beijing relieved 400 million people from poverty, and how well the regime is acquainted with the third article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (everyone has the right to life, liberty, and personal security) and how it is better than any other political party worldwide;
Fourth, whether China’s propaganda is manipulating the world’s media; and,
Fifth, regarding my special column for the Deutsche Welle ("DW") in the past, and why it was dropped.
I have in fact talked about all these issues in my book “Modern China Studies.” I have researched how Beijing influences overseas media, not just Chinese media, and my deep feelings about how Chinese experts in other countries restrain themselves and follow Beijing’s requests. I also understand how the CCP manipulates and uses overseas Chinese language media, Chinese clubs, Chinese [language] schools, and manipulates these “three treasured tools” of United Front Work Department, to do work for it. By the way, the words ‘three treasured tools of United Front Work do not come from me, but the CCP’s United Front Work Department. Those who are curious can look it up in the Department’s documents.
Reporter: An article by Radio Free Asia reported that the DW followed orders from the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department and discontinued your column. Recently, they invited you to write a column again, but you refused. Could you give a little more detail on this?
He QL: In March 2005, the DW Chinese edition invited me to write two to four commentaries on China per month. The director of the Chinese edition was Matthias von Hein, and the person who contacted me was Zhang Danhong. She told me she’d seen me in Cologne, but I could not recall this.
During the first four months, cooperation was smooth. Afterward, I felt there were some disagreements between Zhang and me. She wrote to me in August saying that I was not permitted to write commentaries, because the rules of DW said only directors could write them. I told her that this was our initial agreement, to write commentaries, and if DW changed its mind, the agreement would be terminated. I knew Zhang really couldn’t justify her excuse. In fact, during that time, I discovered that DW, because of its open pro-CCP stand, rarely published my articles on its Chinese website.
Six months later, in March 2006, I received reliable information from Beijing as to why DW wanted to stop publishing my articles. The person in charge of DW made a visit to China, meeting with a deputy director of the News Office of the State Department. The deputy director was concerned about my columns for DW, claiming my analysis that former head of China’s Bureau of Statistics Qiu Xiaohua’s corruption case was unfounded.
In fact, in that article, I meant to point out that Qiu’s corruption was not serious, and Qiu being put in jail was not because of his corruption, but was related to the CCP’s internal [political] machinations. This fact proves that I was right—Qiu is now released from jail and has been given a high paying job to reward his sacrifice.
I was shocked to learn that the media of a democratic country follows a CCP official’s order to stop the column of a dissident writer. Later, I verified from another source that the information I received from Beijing was correct. I gained further understanding of how pro-CCP the DW was. Because I needed to protect my sources I chose to remain silent.
Even when the “Zhang Danhong incident” broke earlier this year, I did not want to bring up my experience with DW. If I had talked, people would think I wanted to retaliate and obscure the focus of the incident.
On October 7, 2008, [Matthias] von Hein wrote me a letter asking me to write a commentary on land reform in agricultural villages in China. That was when the German public questioned the credibility of DW’s reports. The invitation was more like getting a dissident to endorse DW’s reputation. I felt humiliated. I was ashamed of DW’s lack of self-respect, and humiliated that DW thought I belong to the same utilitarianism as it does. Of course I refused to take its offer. Later, I checked with a friend in Germany whether DW was having a credibility crisis. The answer was ‘yes.’
Several days later, a journalist, who conducted an interview with me and published it in the Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung, contacted me regarding the above mention interview, asking about my experience with DW. When this reporter translated the summary of the English interview into German, she mentioned “a governmental propaganda department” instead of the News Office of the State Department. Some Chinese media mistook it as the Central Propaganda Department.
Reporter: What influence do pro-CCP foreign media such as DW have in promoting the CCP’s image? And why would they do that?
He QL: I’ll put it this way, these media have deceptive power that domestic Chinese media doesn’t have. The domestic media in China are known to be the CCP’s mouthpieces and have terrible credibility. In political and social issues, people call these media lie-making machines. People don’t quite trust news from the domestic media, which is quite common in communist countries.
The former USSR leader, Nikita Khrushchev, said that whenever something happened in Russia, he first listened to Voice of America Russian Service, instead of reading Pravda. He did not expect the Party media to tell the truth, neither did Mikhail Gorbachev.
Knowing this, the CCP spends much effort in its overseas United Front Line Work. For example, the CCP directly or indirectly (buying advertising) invests in overseas Chinese media. It bribes staff in the Chinese service departments of several major international broadcast companies, and then lures these companies with “the enormous financial market in China.”
These media, eager to enter the Chinese market, spontaneously restrict themselves with more praises and less criticism on China issues. The Chinese media then selectively carry articles from these media and tell the Chinese people the “tremendous progress” China has gained in international recognition. In other words, these internationally renowned media are endorsing the Chinese government with their credibility.
Being in business motivates the media to pursue profits, and being a social public organ requires the media to pursue truth and social justice. Many foreign media choose to profit by entering the Chinese market. Media workers go with the flow for job security. However, most Chinese reporters in foreign media praise the CCP in a subtle and skilled fashion. Not many of them conduct themselves like Zhang Danhong, who acts as the CCP’s mouthpiece without hesitation, praising China’s improvements in human rights like CCP cadre are known to do. This proves that under DW’s collusion, Zhang is used to praising [the CCP], and forgets where her place is.
Reporter: How can Chinese readers tell how true a story is in a news piece?
He QL: It’s not easy. Readers in China and outside of China face completely different situations. For readers in China, they face an information blockade. Their ability to obtain information depends on their skills to get online and bypass the blockade. Also, what they choose to believe depends on their social status.
For example, many media workers in China have read my book, “Modern China Studies,” but their feedback to me falls into two distinct categories. Some believe the book exposes the truth of how Beijing controls the media and tells the true history; others do not deny the authenticity of the facts in the book, but believe it is necessary to control the media for social stability. I was shocked by the latter.
Overseas Chinese readers are not subjected to such restrictions. What they choose to believe is determined by their own interests, depending on their backgrounds and experience in China, and their current connection to China.
Unable to deny human rights problems and various social conflicts in China, some people decide that domestic shame should not be made public. As to whether there is freedom in China to talk about “domestic shame,” these people refuse to look into it. This is not a problem of judgment, but of conscience.
For instance, I know a reporter who used to work in a major media company in Europe. He was once arrested in Shanghai and brutally beaten. One police officer punched him and threw him to the other side of the room where another kicked him back. He was so furious when talked about what happened.
Now this person is in China running a major website for a European media company. On this website, there are never any topics about problems or social conflicts in China. Even if one reads domestic Chinese media such as “Finance” or “Southern Weekly,” one can see articles revealing social problems. However, every article on his website is about a prosperous, peaceful China that is in good order. It’s not that he doesn’t understand the CCP’s nature; he’s just driven by profits.
It’s a broad and specialized subject on how Chinese readers accept information. We can only touch upon the most fundamental problems at this time.
http://en.epochtimes.com/n2/opinion/china-regime-control-western-chinese-language-news-publications-7174.html
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